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Abstract 
In stand-alone databases, the functions of ordering the 
transaction commits and making the effects of transactions 
durable are performed in one single action, namely the writing 
of the commit record to disk. For efficiency many of these 
writes are grouped into a single disk operation. In replicated 
databases in which all replicas agree on the commit order of 
update transactions, these two functions are typically separated. 
Specifically, the replication middleware determines the global 
commit order, while the database replicas make the transactions 
durable.  
The contribution of this paper is to demonstrate that this 
separation causes a significant scalability bottleneck. It forces 
some of the commit records to be written to disk serially, where 
in a standalone system they could have been grouped together 
in a single disk write. Two solutions are possible: (1) move 
durability from the database to the replication middleware, or 
(2) keep durability in the database and pass the global commit 
order from the replication middleware to the database.  
We implement these two solutions. Tashkent-MW is a pure 
middleware solution that combines durability and ordering in 
the middleware, and treats an unmodified database as a black 
box. In Tashkent-API, we modify the database API so that the 
middleware can specify the commit order to the database, thus, 
combining ordering and durability inside the database. We 
compare both Tashkent systems to an otherwise identical 
replicated system, called Base, in which ordering and durability 
remain separated. Under high update transaction loads both 
Tashkent systems greatly outperform Base in throughput and 
response time. 
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1 Introduction 
Database replication is a cost-effective technique to improve 
performance and to enhance availability. We are concerned here 
with fully replicated designs in which any transaction, read-only 
or update, may execute on any (single) replica and all replicas 
agree on the commit order of the updates. 
The primary contribution of this paper is to reveal a dependency 
between durability and commit ordering of update transactions 
in such designs. In particular, we show that committing 
transactions in a global order and relying on an off-the-shelf 
database to make transactions durable (i.e., write their effects to 
disk) requires commit records to be written to disk serially, a 
significant scalability bottleneck. 
The root cause is the separation in replicated systems of commit 
ordering from the disk writes that ensure durability. In 
standalone databases, these two functions are performed 
together, permitting group-commits to minimize the number of 
synchronous writes to disk. In replicated databases, however, 
ordering is determined in the replication middleware – rather 
than at the database – to ensure a consistent global order. 
Durability has typically been left in the database. 
We propose two approaches to unite these functions. The first 
approach is to move durability to the middleware layer where 
ordering is determined. This solution can be pure middleware, 
so that it can be used with off-the-shelf databases. The second 
approach is to extend the database API so that the replication 
middleware can specify a commit order for update transactions, 
thus combining durability and ordering in the database.  
We implement instances of both approaches, called Tashkent-
MW and Tashkent-API, respectively, and compare them to an 
otherwise identical replication system, called Base, in which 
ordering and durability remain separated. All systems use 
generalized snapshot isolation (GSI) [3] for concurrency 
control, and are derived from PostgreSQL [19]. 
Both Tashkent systems greatly improve scalability under high 
update transaction loads. For instance, at 15 replicas under an 
update-intensive workload the Tashkent systems outperform 
Base by factors of five and three in throughput, while also 
providing lower response times. 
This paper makes the following contributions: 
1. We identify the dependency between durability and 
ordering and demonstrate the performance impact if they 
are not united. 
2. We design and implement Tashkent-MW, a pure 
middleware solution that unites durability and ordering in 
middleware. 
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3. We extend the database API and implement Tashkent-API 
which unites durability and ordering in the database. 
4. We assess both systems for their benefits and costs. 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 gives 
the necessary background on generalized snapshot isolation. In 
Section 3 we detail the issue of separating durability from 
ordering and justify uniting the two. In Section 4 we present the 
design of the Base replication system. In Section 5 we present 
Tashkent-MW and Tashkent-API. We discuss the 
implementation of the replication middleware in Section 6. In 
Section 7 we discuss fault-tolerance of the systems. We discuss 
the replication middleware interface to PostgreSQL in Section 
8. In Section 9 we experimentally compare the three systems 
and analyze their relative performance. Section 10 contrasts this 
research to related work. Finally, in Section 11 we summarize 
the main conclusions. 
2 Background 
Snapshot Isolation (SI) [1] is a concurrency control model for 
centralized multi-version databases. In SI, when a transaction 
begins it receives a snapshot of the database. After the snapshot 
is assigned, it is unaffected by concurrently running 
transactions. A read-only transaction reads from the snapshot 
and can always commit. An update transaction reads from and 
writes to its snapshot, and can commit if it has no write-write 
conflict with any committed update transaction that ran 
concurrently with it.  
Many database vendors use SI, e.g., Oracle, PostgreSQL, 
Microsoft SQL Server, InterBase [1, 7, 10, 16]. SI is weaker 
than serializability, but in practice most applications run 
serializably under SI, including the most widely-used database 
benchmarks TPC-A, TPC-B, TPC-C, and TPC-W. SI has 
attractive performance properties. Most notably, read-only 
transactions never block or abort, and they never cause update 
transactions to block or abort. 
Generalized Snapshot Isolation (GSI) [3] extends SI to 
replicated databases such that the performance properties of SI 
in a centralized setting are maintained in a replicated setting. In 
particular, read-only transactions do not block or abort, and they 
do not cause update transactions to block or abort. Both of these 
properties are important for scalability. In addition, workloads 
that are serializable under SI are also serializable under GSI [3].  
Informally, a replica using GSI works as illustrated in Figure 1. 
When a transaction starts at a database replica, the replica 
assigns its latest snapshot to the transaction. All transaction read 
and write operations are executed locally on the replica against 
the assigned snapshot. At commit, the replica extracts the 
transaction’s modifications to the database into a writeset. A 
writeset captures the minimal set of actions necessary to 
recreate a transaction’s modifications. If the writeset is empty 
(i.e., the transaction is read-only), the transaction commits 
immediately. Otherwise, a certification check is performed to 
detect write-write conflicts among update transactions in the 
replicated system. If no write-write conflict is found, then the 
transaction commits, else the transaction aborts.  
The certifier performs certification and assigns a global total 
order to the commits of update transactions. Since committing 
an update transaction creates a new version (snapshot) of the 
database, the total order defines the sequence of snapshots the 
database replicas go through. Writesets are propagated to all 
replicas to update their state. We refer to writesets of remote 
transactions during the propagation phase as remote 
 
 
Figure 1: Processing an Update Transaction in GSI 
 
writesets. Before committing a local update transaction, if the 
replica is not up-to-date, it must apply remote writesets to bring 
that replica’s state up-to-date. 
3 How Durability and Ordering Affect 
Scalability 
In the GSI algorithm, there is a dependency between 
maintaining the global commit order and writing state to disk 
for durability. Identifying this dependency is one of the core 
contributions of this paper. In this section, we explain the 
problem and its underlying causes via an example, and discuss 
its impact on scalability.  
Centralized SI database. The initial case is a centralized 
system to which we will contrast a replicated system. In a 
centralized system, if clients concurrently submit two update 
transactions T4 and T9 – whose writesets, W4 and W9, do not 
conflict – the database can commit them in any order: T4 then 
T9, or T9 then T4. However, to guarantee durability, each 
commit requires a disk write, a disk write for T4 and another for 
T9. The IO subsystem can group the commits of T4 and T9 into 
a single disk write, which greatly improves performance. 
One GSI replica. Next, consider a replicated GSI database 
consisting of one replica and one certifier, both at version zero. 
If clients submit T4 and T9 concurrently to the replica, it 
executes them and sends their writesets, W4 and W9, to the 
certifier. The certifier checks the writesets, determines that 
there are no conflicts, and assigns them an order. Let us assume 
that the certifier orders W4 at version 1 and W9 at version 2, 
and sends these results back to the replica. 
Upon receiving the responses from the certifier, the replica 
must commit T4 first to reach version 1, then commit T9 to 
reach version 2, the same sequence that the certifier determined. 
Under GSI, the replica cannot change this order. Otherwise, a 
new transaction could receive a snapshot containing the effects 
of T9 but not T4, a snapshot that never existed globally (i.e., at 
the certifier). A typical database offers no mechanism to specify 
a commit order externally. Yet the middleware must not allow 
the replica to swap the order in which the commits of T4 and T9 
occur. Without an external mechanism to enforce a particular 
commit order, the middleware must submit each commit 
serially, waiting for each commit (which includes a disk write) 
to complete. Thus, two disk writes, one to commit T4 and 
another for T9, are required. This serializes a costly component 
of executing update transactions at the replica. 
2
Multiple GSI replicas. We continue the example with a 
replicated GSI system having N replicas. One replica receives 
T4 and T9 and then sends W4 and W9 to the certifier. The 
certifier receives the two writesets, and receives writesets from 
other replicas as well, and creates the following total order: T1, 
T2, T3, T4, T5, T6, T7, T8, T9. Under GSI, the replica must 
observe this total order. Not only must the replica commit 
transaction T4 before T9, but the remote transactions T1, T2, T3 
must commit before T4, and T5, T6, T7, T8 before T9. In a 
naïve implementation, the replica would go through the version 
sequence: 0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, which would 9 synchronous 
disk writes, but this can be improved, as follows. 
Grouping remote writesets. We batch the writesets of several 
remote transactions by combining their effects into one 
transaction T1_2_3 with writeset {W1, W2, W3}, and similarly 
another transaction T5_6_7_8 with writeset {W5, W6, W7, W8}. 
The replica version follows the sequence: 0, 3, 4, 8, 9, which 
requires 4 disk writes (2*M disk writes in general for M local 
update transactions at each replica). 
It is important to note that the middleware is outside the 
database and cannot submit the commits of T1_2_3, T4, 
T5_6_7_8, T9 concurrently to a standard database and force 
committing T1_2_3 first, T4 second, T5_5_7_8 third, then 
finally T9. Databases do not provide such low level 
mechanisms to the client interface.  
The replication middleware cannot allow the database to 
commit the transactions in any order. The commits must follow 
the global order because under certain conditions changing the 
commit order can result in the final state of the database not 
being the same. For example, if T1_2_3 and T5_6_7_8 both 
modify a common database item, then the order in which they 
commit is significant. Furthermore, allowing transactions to 
commit in any order would require the middleware to block the 
start of all new transactions (including read-only transactions), 
lest they observe an inconsistent snapshot (e.g., T9 commits 
internally before T4). This approach has a major performance 
drawback as read-only transactions would block waiting for 
other transactions to finish, voiding the main performance 
benefit of GSI. Therefore, we propose two solutions for uniting 
ordering and durability. 
Solution 1: Move durability to the middleware. One solution 
is to have the middleware, which decides the ordering, be 
responsible for making transaction modifications durable. The 
middleware can then batch all available writesets at 
certification. In the above example, the middleware batches all 
nine writesets into a single disk write. At the replicas, commits 
become in-memory actions and serializing them is not a 
performance issue. 
Solution 2: Pass the ordering information to the database. 
The database API interface is extended such that the 
middleware can specify the commit order. With this API, the 
replication middleware submits all transactions concurrently to 
the database with their required commit order. In the above 
example, the database makes T1_2_3, T4, T5_6_7_8, and T9 
durable in one disk write and commits them in the correct order. 
The key insight is that in both solutions durability is united with 
ordering. Regardless of whether the two are united in the 
replication middleware or in the database, both solutions permit 
IO subsystem optimizations that greatly improve throughput. 
For this paper, the two example solutions assume that the 
standalone database (1) supports the SI concurrency control 
model, (2) has the ability to capture and extract the writesets of 
update transactions, and (3) has the ability to enable/disable 
synchronous writes to disk. 
4 Architecture and Design of Base 
Base represents a traditional replicated database solution in 
which the middleware performs global ordering but relies on 
the database replicas for durability. In Section 5, we derive 
from Base two systems, Tashkent-MW and Tashkent-API, that 
unite ordering and durability. We discuss fault tolerance and 
recovery for each of the three replicated designs in Section 7. 
4.1 Architecture 
Base is a replicated database system that uses GSI for 
concurrency control. Base consists of two main logical 
components both of which are replicated: (1) database replica 
and (2) certifier. When a replica receives a read-only 
transaction, the replica executes it entirely locally. When a 
replica receives an update transaction it executes it locally, 
except the commit operation which requires certification. 
Replicas communicate only with the certifier component, not 
directly with each other. The certifier certifies update 
transactions from all replicas and orders them.  
The Base design is a pure middleware solution since no 
modification to the database source code is required. Attached 
to each replica is a transparent proxy that intercepts database 
requests. The proxy appears as the database to clients, and 
appears as a client to the database. The proxies and certifiers are 
the replication middleware. 
 
Figure 2 - Architecture of Base 
 
Figure 2 shows the architecture of the Base system. The two 
main components, database replica and certifier, are replicated 
asymmetrically with different replication degrees. Database 
replicas are replicated mainly for performance, whereas the 
certifier is replicated mainly for availability. For this study, we 
simply assume a separate certifier component which is itself 
replicated, though our conclusions apply to other 
configurations. For example, the certifier component could be 
implemented via an atomic broadcast mechanism incorporated 
into the proxy at every replica. 
For update propagation, we use writesets rather than the 
original SQL text of update transactions. Although for some 
transactions propagating the original SQL text may be shorter in 
size than the writeset, it is generally more expensive to re-
execute the SQL text at the certifier and then at each replica 
when propagating the effects of the transaction. 
3
4.2 Processing Transactions 
Each transaction is assigned a snapshot. The transaction 
operations are executed locally against the snapshot. The 
commit of a read-only transaction is simple as it always 
commits successfully. However, processing the commit of an 
update transaction is more complex and we informally present 
here the steps under GSI. We provide additional 
implementation details in Sections 6 and 8.  
We use the following terminology. We use version to count 
database snapshots. The version at a particular database replica 
is called replica_version. The database starts at version 
zero, i.e., in the initial state replica_version=0. When an 
update transaction commits, replica_version is 
incremented. Each transaction has two numbers, its version at 
start, tx_start_version, and the version created at its 
commit, tx_commit_version (tx_commit_version is 
valid only for update transactions).  
Certification. When an update transaction attempts to commit, 
the proxy at the replica makes a request for certification to the 
certifier. The certifier performs writeset intersection, a fast main 
memory operation that compares table and field identifiers for 
matches against recent writesets to detect write-write conflicts. 
For the committing transaction Tc with writeset Wc, the certifier 
compares Wc to the set of writesets committed at versions more 
recent (greater) than Tc.tx_start_version. Successfully 
certified writesets (i.e., with no conflicts) are recorded in a 
persistent log, thus creating a global commit order. The log is 
necessary to allow the certifier to recover because we use the 
crash-recovery model. The state of any replica is always a 
consistent prefix of the certifier’s log. Writeset intersection is a 
quick operation and writing to the persistent log is efficient 
because multiple writesets can be batched. Thus, certification is 
lightweight. 
Responding to replicas. The certifier responds to the replica 
with the following: (1) the result of the requested certification 
test, (2) any remote writesets for the intervening update 
transactions at other replicas, and (3) the version at which the 
update transaction commits (if the certification test succeeds). 
The middleware proxy at the replica applies the remote 
writesets to the database before it commits the local update. 
Durability. The durability function is performed in the 
databases. Since the certifier determines the global order of 
commits, proxies commit update transactions and remote 
writesets serially to ensure the same global order is followed at 
each replica. 
5 Tashkent-MW and Tashkent-API 
Tashkent-MW and Tashkent-API are derived from Base to 
combine durability and commit ordering. 
5.1 Tashkent-MW 
To unite durability with ordering in the middleware, we disable 
synchronous writes that guarantee durability in the database 
replicas. Instead, the replication middleware logs the database 
modifications (i.e., writesets) for durability. However, the 
certifier already logs this information via its persistent log to 
allow certifier recovery. Thus, it is relatively simple to 
transform the Base design into Tashkent-MW, because 
enabling/disabling synchronous writes is a standard feature in 
many databases. Furthermore, since Base is a pure middleware 
solution, so then is Tashkent-MW. 
The commit operations at each database replica are still serial, 
but they are now fast in-memory operations. System throughput 
and scalability are greatly improved because the durability 
function is performed at the certifier, which efficiently groups 
the writesets into a much smaller number of synchronous 
writes. There is, however, a cost to moving durability out of the 
databases and it appears in the recovery procedure. We address 
recovery in Section 7. 
5.2 Tashkent-API 
To unite ordering with durability in the database, the API 
available to the middleware is extended so that the commit 
order of update transactions can be specified. The change is to 
the SQL “COMMIT” command to permit an optional integer 
parameter giving the sequence number to the commit (e.g., 
COMMIT 9 to commit current transaction at version 9). Since 
we change the interface of the database, Tashkent-API is not a 
pure replication middleware and the source code of the database 
must be available. 
With the new API, upon receipt of the commit decision from the 
certifier, the Tashkent-API proxy forwards to the database both 
the commit command and the version number returned from the 
certifier. Similarly, remote writesets are applied in separate 
transactions with their appropriate commit sequence numbers. 
The proxy applies remote writesets and local commits to the 
database concurrently. Thus, the database can group the commit 
records as usual for efficient disk IO, but internally the database 
enforces the supplied commit ordering. 
This extended API is a simple interface yet powerful; its use 
should be restricted to the replication middleware. Normal 
clients are unaware of system-wide commit ordering. If the 
interface is abused (e.g., issuing COMMIT 9, without ever 
providing COMMIT 1-8), the database may deadlock, 
potentially aborting the committing transaction to resolve the 
deadlock. 
5.2.1 Constraints under Tashkent-API 
With the new API, it is not always possible for the middleware 
to submit transaction commits concurrently. At these times, 
some commit operations must be serialized, and this reduces the 
performance gain. This section describes the condition for 
which a commit must be serialized and how to detect if this 
condition arises. 
Conflicts may arise when committing two different local update 
transactions. Should their accompanying two remote writesets 
modify a shared element, they generate an “artificial” local 
write-write conflict at the database replica if the middleware 
submits these commits concurrently. Under snapshot isolation, 
a write-write conflict results in one of the transactions being 
aborted. Therefore, the middleware must avoid creating these 
“artificial” conflicts. 
The root of the problem is that the artificially conflicting remote 
writesets, which were generated by remote transactions that did 
not run concurrently, now appear as concurrent to the database 
replica when applied. This situation can only occur in Tashkent-
API, not in Tashkent-MW or Base as they serialize commits. 
We illustrate this case with a concrete example and present a 
detection scheme. 
Artificial Conflict Example. Figure 3 shows two local 
concurrent transactions, T44 and T46 at a replica and two remote 
writesets, W43 and W45, that are applied as local transactions, T43 
and T45. The transactions are labeled with the version at which 
4
they commit globally. For example, T44 starts from a snapshot 
with version 30 and its writeset is W44 . T44 commits as version 
44 globally. But before T44 can commit, remote writeset W43 is 
received from the certifier and applied to the replica as local 
transaction T43. T43 must commit before T44 commits as 
explained in Section 3 to follow the global commit order. 
 
Figure 3: Example of concurrent commits 
 
The proxy can safely submit the commits of transactions T44 
and T46 concurrently at the database along with transactions T43 
and T45 if none of the remote writesets (W43 and W45) conflict. If 
there is no conflict, then the database can write the commit 
records of T43, T44, T45, and T46 in one disk write. This is the 
desired behavior. 
If an artificial conflict exists between T43 and T45, e.g., W43 sets 
x=17 and W45 sets x=39, then this artificial conflict is detected 
and T45 will be serialized waiting for T43 to commit. In this case, 
at least two disk writes are needed. For example, the proxy 
submits transaction T43 and the commit of T44 concurrently, 
waits for the acknowledgement from the database. Then the 
proxy submits transaction T45 and the commit of T46 
concurrently. The best the database can do in this case is to 
group the commits of T43 and T44 into one disk write and the 
commits of T45 and T46 into a second disk write. Therefore, 
artificial conflicts decrease opportunities to group commits. If 
artificial conflicts between remote writesets are frequent, then 
in the worst-case all commits are forced to be serialized and 
Tashkent-API degrades towards the performance of Base. 
Artificial Conflict Detection. The proxy in Tashkent-API 
needs to know if it is safe to apply a remote writeset 
concurrently with previous remote writesets. Concurrency is 
safe if intersection testing is null between the remote writeset 
and the previous remote writesets (e.g., W43 and W45 do not 
modify a shared item). The certifier may already have done this 
intersection testing in the normal certification process at their 
original commit time if the remote writesets were from 
concurrent transactions. 
Our solution is to have the proxy tell the certifier how far back 
(i.e., what prior version) it would like the remote writesets to 
have been tested for write-write conflicts (i.e., intersection 
testing). If one or more of the remote writesets has not already 
been tested that far back, the certifier performs additional 
intersection testing for those writesets. With the commit/abort 
decision, the certifier also returns the version to which the 
remote writesets are conflict-free. The proxy uses this 
information to determine which remote writesets can be 
submitted concurrently. If two remote writesets conflict, then 
the proxy must commit the earlier writeset first before 
submitting the latter one. 
The version the proxy submits to the certifier need only be the 
current version of the database as no remote writesets will be 
returned prior to this version (recall that remote writesets carry 
updates the replica has not seen yet). The proxy stores the 
current version of a replica in replica_version and it is this 
version the proxy submits with a transaction to the certifier. 
In the example of Figure 3, to certify T46, W46 is certified back 
to version 42 (T46.tx_start_version) in normal 
certification. Next, assuming that the accompanying remote 
writeset W45 was only certified to version 44 at the time of its 
commit, then W45 is also additionally certified back to 
replica_version=42 if it is to be committed concurrently 
with T43 and T44. If there is a conflict then the proxy delays 
submitting W45 until the conflicting transaction T43 commits. 
The overhead of the additional certification checks at the 
certifier is minimal. The certifier records for each writeset the 
point to where it has been (further) certified and avoids repeated 
checks for responses to other replicas. 
6 Implementation of the Replication 
Middleware 
In this section, we provide the pseudo-code of GSI and show 
how it is implemented as pure middleware. In Section 8 we 
discuss the mechanisms used by the proxy to interface to 
PostgreSQL. 
6.1 Certifier 
The certifier maintains (1) a persistent log recording tuples of 
each writeset and its commit version (writeset, 
tx_commit_version) for all committed update transactions 
and (2) the global system version (system_version). A 
certification request provides the certifier with the writeset and 
start version of the transaction (T.writeset, 
T.tx_start_version). The certifier returns the remote 
writesets, the certification result (commit or abort), and the 
commit version of the transaction (tx_commit_version). The 
pseudo code of actions at the certifier for a transaction T is the 
following: 
 
On a certification request for transaction T having 
(T.tx_start_version, T.writeset):  
1. The input T.writeset is tested for intersection against entries in 
LOG whose tx_commit_version is greater than 
T.tx_start_version. An intersection occurs if two writesets 
overlap (signaling a write-write conflict).  
2. IF there is no intersection,  
THEN  { 
• decision ← “commit”,  
• increment system_version,  
• T.tx_commit_version ← system_version, 
• append (T.writeset, T.tx_commit_version) to 
persistent LOG } 
ELSE   decision ← “abort”. 
3. The output of the procedure contains: 
• the remote writesets that the replica has not received 
yet between tx_start_version and 
T.tx_commit_version,  
• decision (either “commit” or “abort”), 
• T.tx_commit_version.  
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We implement the certifier as a multi-threaded server in C with 
worker threads to receive and process certification requests and 
send responses. The certifier has a single writer thread for 
writing the certifier log to the disk, which makes the certifier 
very efficient at batching all outstanding writesets to disk via a 
single fsync call. 
6.2 Transparent Proxy 
A proxy in front of each database intercepts incoming database 
requests. The proxy tracks the database version 
(replica_version), maintains a small amount of state for 
each active transaction, invokes certification, and applies the 
remote writesets. The pseudo code for actions at the proxy is 
the following: 
 
A- On proxy intercepting T’s BEGIN:  
1. T receives a snapshot of the database,  
2. T.tx_start_version ← replica_version. 
B- On T read and write operations:  
1. Read and write operations are executed on T’s snapshot. 
C- On proxy intercepting T’s COMMIT:  
1. T.writeset is extracted.  
2. IF  T.writeset is empty (i.e., T is read-only),  
THEN  T commits,  
ELSE  invoke certification ( T.tx_start_version, 
T.writeset ) 
3. Receive three outputs from certification:  
(a) remote writesets,  
(b) “commit” or “abort”,  
(c) T.tx_commit_version. 
4. Replica applies the remote writesets (a) in their own transaction. 
5. IF  the second output (b) is “commit”,  
THEN  { T commits, and  
replica_version ← T.tx_commit_version (c)}. 
ELSE  T aborts.  
 
The proxy intercepts database requests without any 
modification to the database as explained below. The labels 
refer to the corresponding parts of the pseudo code. 
[A1] Intercepting BEGIN. The proxy creates a new record 
(tx_start_version, tx_commit_version), and assigns 
tx_start_version = replica_version. The proxy 
forwards “BEGIN” to the database. 
[C2] Intercepting COMMIT. The proxy extracts the writeset 
of the transaction. If the writeset is empty (i.e., a read-only 
transaction), “COMMIT” is forwarded to the database; else the 
proxy invokes certification by sending T.writeset, 
T.tx_start_version to the certifier, and waits for the output 
from the certifier. 
[C3] Receiving certifier output. The proxy receives remote 
writesets, the certification decision and 
T.tx_commit_version.  
[C4] Remote writesets. Remote writesets are first stored in a 
memory-mapped file, called proxy_log, a new transaction is 
started containing the remote writesets, the transaction is sent to 
the database, and the proxy waits for the reply. The database 
executes the transaction, applies the updates, and sends the 
commit to the proxy.  
[C5] Finalizing the COMMIT. If the certifier decision is 
abort, the proxy forwards “ABORT” to the database, aborting 
transaction T. If the certifier decision is commit, the proxy 
forwards “COMMIT” to the database and awaits the reply. In 
Tashkent-API, T.tx_commit_version is added as a 
parameter to the “COMMIT”. The database commits the 
transaction. Then, the proxy updates replica_version = 
T.tx_commit_version. 
Steps [C4] and [C5] are serialized both in Base and Tashkent-
MW. The proxy applies the remote writesets, waits for the reply 
from the database, sends the transaction commit, and again 
waits for the reply from the database. For Tashkent-MW, this 
serialization is quick since the database acts essentially as an in-
memory database. For Tashkent-API, steps [C4] and [C5] can 
be concurrent since the commit command includes the commit 
order. 
Local certification. Local certification is a performance 
optimization where the proxy performs partial certification 
against a local copy of the remote writesets it has seen so far. 
By locally certifying a writeset, the proxy increments the 
effective start version of a transaction which reduces the work 
at the certifier. If local certification fails, the transaction is 
aborted, obviating unnecessary processing at the certifier. 
Conservative assigning of versions is safe under GSI. The 
proxy always assigns its most recent value of 
replica_version to new transactions (step [A1] above). 
However, during the execution of steps [C4] and [C5], the 
database commits the transaction before informing the proxy. 
Therefore, it is possible that the database has already performed 
the commit and gives the new transaction a newer snapshot of 
the database. This is safe under GSI because certification is 
correct as long as the new transaction is labeled with a version 
that is the same or earlier than its actual version. The certifier 
still detects all write-write conflicts. 
Bounding Staleness. Remote writesets are sent in response to 
update transaction commits. If a replica does not receive an 
update transaction for a period of time (e.g., a few seconds), its 
proxy proactively requests remote writesets from the certifier to 
bring the replica up-to-date.  
Proxy Implementation. The proxy is implemented as a multi-
threaded Java program. The proxy provides a JDBC interface to 
clients, and it uses a JDBC driver suitable for the database. All 
access to the replicated tables must go through the proxy, and 
not directly to the database. 
7 Fault Tolerance 
In all systems, we use the crash-recovery model— a node may 
crash and subsequently recover an unbounded number of times. 
Safety is always guaranteed. If any number of replica or certifier 
nodes fail, no transaction is lost as all effects of every 
committed update transaction are durable in the system. 
Progress depends on the number of failures. Read-only 
transactions can be processed if at least one replica is up. 
Update transactions can be processed if a majority of certifier 
nodes are up and at least one replica is up.  
7.1 Replica Recovery for Tashkent-MW 
Moving durability outside the database may interfere with the 
database recovery subsystem. Informally, turning off durability 
in a database should not affect physical data integrity 
(correctness of data pages on disk). In some databases, 
however, when durability is disabled, physical data integrity 
may be violated as well, producing corrupt data pages in case of 
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database crash. In this subsection we explain this further and 
outline a middleware recovery scheme. 
Modern databases use write-ahead logging (WAL), which 
improves their IO performance. For guaranteeing physical data 
integrity, a database can write a dirty data page only if the 
corresponding record in the WAL is stable on disk. Therefore, 
if the database crashes while writing a dirty data page and the 
data page becomes corrupt, then the page can still be recovered 
using the undo/redo information in the WAL. 
Thus, the WAL is written to disk for two reasons: (1) to commit 
update transactions and make their effects durable (i.e., for 
durability), and (2) to allow dirty data pages to be safely written 
to disk without violating integrity (i.e., for physical data 
integrity). Databases typically offer one of two options for 
disabling WAL activity. This generates two cases on how 
recovery is performed. 
Case 1: Disable both integrity and durability. Most databases 
offer the option of “disabling all WAL synchronous writes”, 
voiding both durability and physical data integrity guarantees— 
that is if the database crashes, some committed update 
transactions may be lost and a data page may be corrupt. When 
we deploy Tashkent-MW on such databases, we disable all 
WAL synchronous writes for performance, which voids 
physical data integrity (but durability is still guaranteed in the 
middleware). Therefore, to guarantee physical data integrity, 
the Tashkent-MW middleware periodically asks the database to 
make a copy, with the middleware recording the database 
version at the point of its request. Most databases have direct 
support for taking such a copy even while the database is 
normally processing transactions. In SI databases taking a 
database copy is logically equivalent to a reading database 
snapshot. 
The Tashkent-MW middleware maintains two complete copies 
of the database. If the database crashes, the middleware restarts 
the database with the last copy, or the second to last copy (in 
the case where the database crashed while dumping the last 
copy). Next, the middleware updates the state of the database 
by applying all remote writesets that have occurred since the 
version of the copy used for recovery. We use this alternative 
with PostgreSQL because it uses write-ahead logging and can 
either enable or disable all WAL synchronous writes. 
Case 2: Disable only durability. The second case is where 
databases offer the option of “enable WAL synchronous writes, 
but disable WAL synchronous writes on commits of update 
transactions”. This option guarantees data integrity but does not 
guarantee durability. In other words, if the database crashes, it 
can recover to a previous committed state but some update 
transactions that committed after the last WAL synchronous 
write may be lost. If the database offers this feature, Tashkent-
MW does not need to take database copies. The database uses 
its recovery mechanism and then the middleware applies the 
necessary remote writesets to bring the database up-to-date. 
7.2 Replica Recovery for Base and 
Tashkent-API 
In both Base and Tashkent-API, the database uses its standard 
recovery scheme, redoing/undoing transactions in the database 
log as necessary. The middleware proxy re-applies update 
transactions whose commits were forwarded to the database but 
were not acknowledged. In Base, this is at most one transaction 
because update transactions commit serially. In Tashkent-API, 
this is at most the set of update transactions whose commit 
operations were concurrent at the time of the crash.  
If the set of uncommitted update transactions are not known 
(e.g., the proxy crashes with the database), the proxy can obtain 
the missing writesets from the certifier’s log and apply them. 
Reapplying writesets in the global order is always safe. At the 
end of this step, the proxy knows the version of the database. 
After the database recovers and the proxy updates the database, 
the replica resumes normal operations. 
7.3 Certifier Replication and Recovery 
The certifier is identical in all three systems. The certifier state 
is replicated for availability across a small set of nodes using 
Paxos [13]. The replication algorithm uses a leader elected 
from the set of certifiers. The leader is responsible for receiving 
all certification requests. 
Normal Case. When the leader receives certification requests, 
it performs normal GSI certification and selects which 
transactions may commit. Then, it sends the new state (i.e., the 
log records containing writesets of the selected transactions) to 
all certifiers including itself. All certifiers write the new state to 
disk and reply to the leader. When a majority of certifiers reply, 
the leader declares those transactions as committed. 
On Failure. When a certifier crashes, a new leader is elected (if 
necessary) and certification continues making progress 
whenever a majority of certifiers are up.  
On Recovery. When a certifier recovers from a crash, it 
requests an update via a state transfer from another up certifier, 
participates in electing a new leader (if necessary), and logs 
certification requests to disk. 
8 Middleware Interface to PostgreSQL 
8.1 Proxy-Database Interface 
The interaction between the proxy and database is database-
specific. We describe here how to interface to PostgreSQL. For 
another database, the specifics would change, but the 
underlying mechanisms are common in most databases. 
Writeset Extraction. Extracting the writeset of a transaction is 
not defined in the SQL standard, but many databases provide 
mechanisms to do so, such as triggers in PostgreSQL, direct 
support in Oracle, and log sniffing in Microsoft SQL Server. 
In PostgreSQL, we define triggers on the following events 
“INSERT”, “UPDATE”, and “DELETE” for replicated tables. 
When a trigger is fired it (1) captures the new row in case of 
“INSERT”, (2) captures the primary key(s) and the modified 
columns for “UPDATE”, or (3) captures the primary key for 
“DELETE”. The trigger also records the table name and 
operation type. These changes are stored in a memory mapped 
file in order to give access of partial writesets to the proxy (see 
Eager Pre-certification below). 
Recovery. For recovery in Tashkent-MW, the proxy sends a 
“DUMP DATA” command to the database periodically to 
create the backup copy. The proxy stores replica_version, 
timestamp, dump data, end-of-file marker with a checksum in a 
file. If the database crashes, the proxy restarts the database 
using the appropriate dump file. 
Soft Recovery. The proxy may send “COMMIT” to the 
database, and the database decides to abort the transaction due 
to exceptional circumstances, such as running out of disk space, 
performing garbage collection to delete old snapshots, or a 
crash of one database process. In such cases, the proxy aborts 
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all active transactions, and re-applies sequentially the remote 
writesets and the previously aborted transaction. If soft recovery 
fails, the proxy performs normal system recovery. 
8.2 Deadlock Avoidance 
Because PostgreSQL uses write locks, a deadlock may develop 
between the writeset of a local transaction and the writeset from 
a remote transaction. This deadlock scenario exists in all three 
designs Base, Tashkent-MW, and Tashkent-API. 
Write Locks in PostgreSQL. Since PostgreSQL (and other 
centralized SI databases) immediately sees all partial writesets 
of active update transactions, it uses write locks to eagerly test 
for write-write conflicts during transaction execution rather than 
at commit time. The first transaction that acquires a write lock 
on a database item may proceed, blocking competitors who 
want to update the same database item. If the lock holder 
commits, all competitors abort. If the lock holder aborts, one of 
the competitors may proceed. 
Traditional Deadlock Scenario. In a centralized database, 
deadlock may develop between two update transactions T1 and 
T2. Suppose T1 holds a write-lock on x and T2 holds a write-
lock on y. Then, T2 tries to update x and T1 tries to update y. 
Neither T1 nor T2 can proceed as each is waiting for the other. 
Deadlock between a Local Writeset and a Remote Writeset. 
In a replicated system, a similar deadlock situation can arise if 
T2 is on a remote replica, has been certified, and is being 
applied as a remote writeset to the replica where T1 is currently 
executing and holding a lock. Unlike the standalone system, in 
the replicated system T2 must eventually be permitted to 
commit at the replica and T1 will eventually be aborted either at 
the replica or at the certifier. 
Some databases allow tagging transactions with priorities. If 
such a mechanism is available then avoiding a deadlock is 
straight forward: we mark remote writesets with high priority, 
aborting any conflicting local transaction. However, 
PostgreSQL does not have priorities. Therefore, we can either 
(a) do nothing letting PostgreSQL handle deadlocks between 
remote writesets and local update transactions (we run soft 
recovery if PostgreSQL aborts a remote writeset), or (b) detect 
and prevent deadlocks eagerly in the middleware as an 
optimization using eager pre-certification. 
Eager Pre-certification. The proxy can avoid deadlocks by 
eagerly detecting write-write conflicts between remote writesets 
and local writesets. Conceptually, we leverage the local 
certification functionality at the proxy (Section 6.2) to eagerly 
certify every write in a transaction as it occurs against the 
pending remote writesets. Similarly, remote writesets received 
at the replica are verified against the current group of partial 
writesets. If a write-write conflict is found in any case, the 
proxy aborts the conflicting local update transaction, which 
allows the remote writeset to be executed. 
Both local certification and eager pre-certification do not 
increase the total number of low-level certification 
comparisons. They change when (earlier than the commit time) 
and where (on the replica rather than on the certifier) some 
certification comparisons are performed, so they have the 
benefit of distributing the certification load to the replicas 
(though the time for certifying a writeset is typically an order of 
magnitude less than that of executing the transaction itself). 
8.3 Extending the Database API 
For Tashkent-API, the database must enforce a specified 
commit ordering. In PostgreSQL, modifications of a transaction 
are visible after (1) the commit record is written to disk and (2) 
the transaction is announced as committed. Thus, to control the 
sequence of commits we need only control the order in which 
transactions are announced as committed. We modify 
PostgreSQL so that all pending commit operations wait upon a 
semaphore after writing their commit records to disk, i.e., we 
control only the second step, when a transaction is “announced” 
as committed. The semaphore is initialized to 0 at system start 
and incremented after each commit. Each commit requests the 
semaphore with a count matching the specified ordering 
sequence and blocks until the semaphore count progresses 
sufficiently. This method requires minimal changes to 
PostgreSQL (20 lines of source code). 
The database may write the commit records to disk in an order 
different from the order in which transactions are announced as 
committed. Since this behavior is identical to the original 
standalone PostgreSQL system, database recovery is not 
affected by this change. 
9 Performance Evaluation 
9.1  Methodology 
Under GSI read-only transactions are executed locally on the 
receiving replica. The scalability of the replicated system is 
limited by the rate of updates and the overhead of maintaining 
consistency. Thus, we assess the performance of uniting 
durability with ordering by comparing Tashkent-MW and 
Tashkent-API to Base using three benchmarks that vary widely 
in their update rates.  
AllUpdates Benchmark. We developed a benchmark, called 
AllUpdates, in which clients rapidly generate back-to-back 
short update transactions that do not conflict. The average 
writeset size is 54 bytes for each update transaction. AllUpdates 
represents a worst-case workload for a replicated system.  
TPC-B Benchmark. TPC-B is a benchmark from the 
Transaction Processing Council [23] that uses transactions 
containing small writes and one read. The average writeset size 
is 158 bytes. In contrast to the AllUpdates benchmark, TPC-B 
transactions have both reads and writes, plus its workload 
contains write-write conflicts.  
TPC-W Benchmark. TPC-W is a benchmark from the 
Transaction Processing Council designed to evaluate e-
commerce systems. It implements an on-line bookstore and has 
three workload mixes. We report results from the most 
commonly used shopping mix workload (with 20% updates). 
The average writeset size is 275 bytes. In contrast to the other 
two benchmarks, the relatively heavy-weight transactions of 
TPC-W make CPU processing the bottleneck. 
Thus, the three benchmarks AllUpdates, TPC-B, and TPC-W 
represent a spectrum of workloads differing in terms of fraction 
of writes, transactions complexity and conflict rate. We 
measure the performance of a single standalone database and 
determine the number of clients needed to generate 85% of the 
peak throughput. In the following experiments, each replica is 
driven at this load. 
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System specification. Each machine in our cluster runs the 
2.6.11 Linux kernel on a single Intel Xeon 2.4GHz CPU with 
1GB ECC SDRAM, and a 120GB 7200pm disk drive. The 
machines are connected through a switched 1Gbps Ethernet 
LAN. We use a leader certifier and two backups for fault 
tolerance (see Section 7.3). We use the PostgreSQL 8.0.3 
database configured to run transactions at the snapshot isolation 
level (which is the strictest isolation level in PostgreSQL where 
it is called the “serializable transaction isolation level”).  
IO channel for durability. To guarantee durability we use 
synchronous disk writes with the Linux system calls write() and 
fsync(), such that the fsync call returns only after the data has 
been flushed to disk (i.e., to the disk media rather than to the 
disk cache). On our system fsync takes about 8ms, but the actual 
time varies depending on where the data resides on disk (6ms-
12ms).  
9.2 AllUpdates 
Figure 4 shows the throughput results for Base, Tashkent-MW, 
and Tashkent-API running AllUpdates. The x-axis is the 
number of replicas and the y-axis is the requests per second 
(i.e., transactions per second). The corresponding response 
times are shown in Figure 5. 
In Figure 4, the throughput curve for Base is at the bottom and 
grows linearly at the rate of just over 49 req/sec, up to 735 
req/sec at 15 replicas. This matches the capacity of each 
replica’s IO channel to process synchronous writes. At 8 ms per 
fsync call, when commits are serialized the upper limit on 
throughput is 125 req/sec. If remote writesets are returned in the 
certification process (which is the case even at two replicas) 
then two writes are required to commit each local update 
transaction, one for the grouped remote writesets and one for 
the local transaction, for an expected limit of 50-60 local 
transaction commits per second depending on the time to 
complete the fsync. 
In contrast, Tashkent-MW achieves a total throughput of 3657 
req/sec at 15 replicas, or five times that of Base. This high 
throughput is achieved because with durability united with 
ordering at the certifier, it is able to group an average of 29 
writesets per fsync. 
Tashkent-API also performs much better than Base, achieving 
2240 req/sec, or three times that of Base. While its throughput 
is also very high, Tashkent-API does not achieve the 
Figure 4: Throughput for AllUpdates (shared IO). 
 
Figure 5: Resp. Time for AllUpdates (shared IO). 
Figure 6: Throughput for AllUpdates (dedicated IO). 
 
Figure 7: Resp. Time for AllUpdates (dedicated IO). 
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performance of Tashkent-MW, for three reasons. First, 
Tashkent-API has an inherently longer round-trip latency for 
each client request than Tashkent-MW. There are two disk 
writes in the path of each update transaction: one at the certifier 
for middleware recovery and one in the database for durability. 
This extra fsync delay extends the response time and depresses 
the throughput somewhat (Base is not likewise limited as 
commit serialization at the database is by far its bottleneck). 
Second, each of our servers has only one disk. With a single 
disk, the IO channel is shared between three different IO 
streams: reading the database pages, writing back dirty database 
pages, and durability logging. Third, Tashkent-MW and 
Tashkent-API write somewhat different log information in 
different ways. 
To explore the effects of these factors on Tashkent-API, we first 
eliminate the extra latency at the certifier. While durability in 
the certifier is necessary for middleware recovery, we run with 
it off and show the resulting throughput in the fourth curve 
tashAPInoCERT in Figure 4. In this case the certifier performs 
certification as usual, but it does not write information to disk. 
Without the IO delay at the certifier, the throughput increases to 
2901 req/sec, but still less than Tashkent-MW. 
Next, since logging IO is in the critical path when durability is 
in the database, we create a dedicated logging channel by 
putting the database in ramdisk. Therefore, the IO channel is 
dedicated to logging, and reading and writing database pages 
occurs in the main memory. We show in Figures 6 and 7 the 
results of using ramdisk. The relative throughput behavior in 
Figure 6 is similar to that in Figure 4, but all the curves adjust 
up somewhat because less contention improves throughput. 
However, the effect is minor as AllUpdates runs essentially 
from memory, resulting in very little activity for reading and 
writing database pages in the steady state.  
We attribute the remaining performance difference between 
Tashkent-MW and Tashkent-API (i.e., between curves tashMW 
and tashAPInoCERT in Figure 6) to differences between 
PostgreSQL and the certifier. The certifier logs only the 
writeset, whereas PostgreSQL logs before/after images of data 
pages. In addition, PostgreSQL has a heavier-weight 
multiprocess design compared to the multithreaded design of 
the certifier for Tashkent-MW. We expect the differences 
would disappear with proper changes to PostgreSQL. 
The response times in Figures 5 and 7 both show a jump in the 
response time for Base between one replica and two replicas. At 
one replica there is only one fsync to commit each local 
transaction (there are no remote writesets). At two or more 
replicas an additional fsync call per local transaction is 
necessary for the remote writesets. 
More specifically, for Base in Figure 7 where the logging 
channel is dedicated, there are 10 clients at each replica which 
results in approximately 10 concurrent local requests at each 
replica. Thus, the response time at one replica is about 90 msec 
(each client request waits for the other 9 fsync calls plus its own 
fsync). At two replicas and onwards, the response time rises to 
nearly 180 msec. This delay includes the 10 fsyncs to commit 
the local transactions, plus another 10 fsyncs to commit the 
grouped remote writeset for each local transaction. For the 
Tashkent systems, the delay increases slowly reflecting the 
overhead of processing more remote writesets at each replica. 
The certifier is lightweight. For example, at 15 replicas in the 
Tashkent-MW system, the certifier certifies 3657 req/sec while 
its disk is less than 50% utilized and its CPU utilization is 
below 20%. 
The replication middleware does not add significant overheard. 
The throughput of a 1-replica Tashkent-MW system running the 
full replication protocol is within 5% of a standalone system. 
For example, under the AllUpdates benchmark using a shared 
IO channel, a standalone database gives a throughput of 517 
req/sec with 17 msec average response time compared to 490 
req/sec with 18 msec for 1-replica Tashkent-MW system. The 
performance is similar when using a dedicated IO channel (515 
req/sec with 17 msec for standalone versus 491 req/sec with 18 
msec for 1-replica Tashkent-MW). Moreover, we see the same 
behavior under TPC-B and TPC-W; a 1-replica Tashkent-MW 
gives a performance close to that of a standalone database. 
In summary, under this worst-case update-intensive workload, 
both Tashkent-MW and Tashkent-API show impressive 
scalability improvements. Tashkent-MW and Tashkent-API 
have improvements of 5.0x/3.0x (shared IO) and 5.0x/3.2x 
(dedicated IO) over Base. 
9.3 TPC-B 
TPC-B is also an update-intensive benchmark, but the 
transactions include reads from the database as well. The 
throughput and response times are shown in Figures 8 and 9, in 
the case of a shared IO channel. We see the same relative 
performance of the systems: Tashkent-MW gives highest 
performance (2.6x Base), Base the lowest, and Tashkent-API 
(1.3x Base) performs in between the other two.  
Again, to explore the difference between Tashkent-MW and 
Tashkent-API, we remove the fsync in the certifier and show its 
improvement in the curve tashAPInoCERT, resulting in a 
somewhat higher throughput.  
We also plot in Figures 10 and 11 the throughput and response 
time results in the case of a dedicated IO channel (i.e., the 
database is in ramdisk). Here all curves are higher, but there is 
still a significant difference between Tashkent-MW and 
Tashkent-API. This difference is not due only to the additional 
latency at the certifier as the curve tashAPInoCERT shows little 
additional throughput with the dedicated logging channel. 
Unlike AllUpdates, TPC-B generates “artificial” conflicts 
among remote writesets (Section 5.2.1). An artificial conflict 
among remote writesets prevents Tashkent-API from 
submitting them concurrently to the database. This reduces 
opportunities to unite durability and ordering. When such an 
artificial conflict is detected, some remote writesets must be 
submitted serially in separate fsync calls. These additional 
fsyncs degrade Tashkent-API’s performance. The artificial 
conflict rate between remote writeset groups is 35% in TPC-B. 
Finally, the response times in Figures 9 and 11 increase steadily 
as replicas are added. This reflects the overhead of applying 
writesets at the replicas. 
9.4 TPC-W 
In Figure 12 we show the throughput of TPC-W with the 
shopping mix (20% updates) for a shared IO channel. There is 
no difference between Tashkent-API and Base because the 
update rate is very low. At the maximum throughput of 240 tps, 
there are only 48 updates per second system wide. At 15 
replicas, this means each replica generates only about 3 updates 
per second on average (requiring 3*2 fsync() calls per second at 
each replica), much lower than what is needed to saturate the 
local logging channel. Thus, Tashkent-API has no opportunity 
to group commits to disk. At very low update rates, separating 
ordering and durability does not create a bottleneck. 
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The response times of read-only and update transactions are 
shown in Figure 13. Update transaction response times are 
similar for Tashkent-API and Base. Furthermore, the response 
times for read-only transactions are similar for all systems as 
read-only transactions are handled in the same way in all three 
systems. 
However, the performance of Tashkent-MW is better than both 
Tashkent-API and Base. The reason is the shared IO channel for 
Tashkent-API and Base. With the shared IO channel and the 
larger database, Tashkent-API and Base experience 
significantly higher critical path fsync delays due to non-
logging IO congestion. Using a dedicated logging channel 
would alleviate this congestion, but the large TPC-W 
environment does not fit in ramdisk on our machines. We 
expect that both Tashkent-API and Base would match the 
performance of Tashkent-MW if the logging channel is 
dedicated and the update rate remains low. 
9.5 The effect of aborts 
One may wonder if the benefits of Tashkent remain present 
even under workloads with a substantial number of aborts. In 
Figure 14 we demonstrate that this is the case. We show the 
effects of aborts using the AllUpdates benchmark because TPC-
B and TPC-W have very few (non-artificial) conflicts and 
subsequently low abort rates. 
In AllUpdates, we force a system-wide abort rate by having the 
certifier randomly abort requests at that rate. If a certification 
request is selected to be aborted, the abort occurs after the full 
certification check, so that all computational overhead at the 
certifier is incurred. 
In Figure 14 we use exaggerated abort rates to demonstrate how 
the “goodput” (the throughput of non-aborted requests) is 
affected. We force three different abort rates: 0%, 20%, and 
40%. The top three lines are for Tashkent-MW, the middle 
three are for Tashkent-API, and the bottom three are for Base. 
Thus, even under high abort rates the Tashkent systems have 
significantly higher performance than Base.  
9.6 Recovery time 
We report the recovery times for TPC-W because it is the 
largest of the three benchmarks (the database size is ~700 MB) 
and the most costly to recover. 
Figure 8: Throughput for TPC-B (shared IO). 
 
Figure 9: Resp. Time for TPC-B (shared IO). 
Figure 10: Throughput for TPC-B (dedicated IO). 
 
Figure11: Resp. Time for TPC-B (dedicated IO). 
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Tashkent-MW database recovery. Tashkent-MW requires 
taking periodic copies of the database for its recovery. In a 15-
replica system, a replica requires about 230 seconds to dump a 
complete copy of the database while it continues processing 
transactions. That replica’s throughput degrades by 13% during 
the 230 seconds. After a crash, a replica requires 140 seconds to 
restore the database from the dump file. 
Tashkent-API and Base database recovery. In Tashkent-API 
and Base, a database replica recovers exactly as a standalone 
database. The database reaches a consistent state using its own 
internal recovery procedure in a few seconds (2-4 seconds). 
 
Figure 14. Certifier goodput under  
different abort rates (dedicated IO). 
 
Applying writesets (all systems). After a database recovers, 
the proxy applies the remote writesets that occurred during the 
down time and recovery time of the database. The proxy 
batches the remote writesets and applies them to the database at 
a rate of 900 writesets per second. At 15 replicas, the rate of 
updates is 56 writesets per second (20% update of 280 req/sec, 
in Tashkent-MW). For H hours of down time, it requires 
approximately 222*H seconds.  
Certifier recovery. A certifier recovers much faster than a 
database. Its recovery time is dominated by the time required to 
update its log. The growth rate of the certifier log at 15 replicas 
is 201,600 writesets per hour at an average of 275 bytes per 
writeset, or 56 MB per hour. The log is transferred from one of 
the up certifiers and is essentially a file transfer that takes about 
1 second in our LAN for each hour of down time. 
9.7 Summary 
Under high update workloads, separating durability from 
ordering creates a significant scalability bottleneck. Combining 
these two functions, either in the middleware or in the database, 
alleviates this bottleneck and greatly improves performance. 
The Tashkent-MW solution is more robust than Tashkent-API 
if the workload has a significant fraction of artificial conflicts. 
Such a workload forces Tashkent-API to serialize some 
commits and behave more like Base.  
10 Related Work 
10.1 SI, GSI, and Serializability  
Serializability [17, 2] is the most common database correctness 
criteria. Snapshot isolation (SI) provides a weaker form of 
consistency than serializability. Several researchers [5, 7, 4] 
have recently demonstrated that, under certain conditions on the 
workload, transactions executing on a database with SI produce 
serializable histories. Those conditions hold for many 
applications (including the TPC-A, TPC-B, TPC-C, and TPC-
W benchmarks). Even if these conditions do not hold for an 
application that uses a fixed set of transaction templates, these 
transaction templates can be modified automatically to be 
serializable under SI. In practice, database developers 
understand SI and are capable of using it. 
The notion of generalized snapshot isolation (GSI) is introduced 
in Elnikety et al. [3]. Generalized snapshot isolation preserves 
SI isolation guarantees. In particular, the authors prove that if 
an application runs serializably under SI, it also runs 
serializably under GSI. In our experimental results section, the 
workload assigned to the databases is serializable under GSI as 
previously indicated [3, 4]. 
Figure 12: Throughput for TPC-W 
 shopping mix (shared IO). 
 
Figure 13: Resp. Time for TPC-W 
 shopping mix (shared IO). 
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10.2 Database Replication 
Gray et al. [9] have classified database replication into two 
schemes: eager and lazy. Eager replication provides 
consistency, usually at the cost of limited scalability. Lazy 
replication increases performance by allowing replicas to 
diverge, possibly exposing clients to inconsistent states of the 
database. 
Tashkent has both eager and lazy features. Tashkent uses GSI 
and avoids global write-write conflicts eagerly during 
certification. It appears as a single snapshot isolated database to 
clients. It does not need update reconciliation and the effects of 
committed update transactions are not lost in the system due to 
a replica failure. However, replicas are not updated in lockstep. 
If a replica does not receive update transactions, it may become 
stale. Tashkent bounds staleness using a simple mechanism to 
fetch updates from the certifier (Section 6.2). 
10.3 Replication in SI Databases 
Kemme et al. [12] discuss how to implement different isolation 
levels (including serializability and snapshot isolation) in 
replicated databases using group communication primitives. In 
addition, they implement Postgres-R [11], and integrate the 
replica management with the database concurrency control [24, 
14] in Postgres-R(SI). 
Postgres-R(SI) uses a replicated form of snapshot isolation. In 
contrast to Postgres-R(SI) [24, 14], the two Tashkent systems 
have the key feature of uniting ordering and durability, they 
never block read-only transactions and Tashkent-MW is a pure 
middleware solution. Postgres-R(SI) commits update 
transactions sequentially. This limits scalability if durability is 
guaranteed by the database but ordering is determined in the 
middleware. The database needs one fsync call for each 
commit. The Tashkent systems remove this fsync bottleneck. 
In Postgres-R(SI) the replication protocol is tightly coupled 
with the concurrency control. For example in one of the 
prototypes, the replication middleware accesses PostgreSQL 
lock tables and replicas map internal transaction IDs to global 
transaction IDs. The validation function in Postgres-R(SI) 
(similar to our certification) is replicated with each database; 
whereas in our work the certifier and replica components are 
replicated asymmetrically to enhance certifier availability and 
replica performance. In large scale systems under heavy loads, 
co-locating the certifier with each database replica marginally 
improves the certifier availability (over asymmetric replication) 
and makes the certifier compete on resources with the database 
at each replica, possibly reducing replica performance. 
Plattner et al. [18] present Ganymed, a master-slave scheme for 
replicating snapshot isolated databases in clusters of machines. 
In Ganymed, all update transactions are handled by a master 
and read-only transactions are distributed among slaves. 
Ganymed serializes commits on the master using one fsync for 
each commit. During update propagation, transactions commit 
serially at the slaves as well. Both the master and the slaves 
could benefit from the extended API described in this paper. 
However, a single master system such as Ganymed is limited to 
the throughput of a single machine to fully process all update 
transactions. The Tashkent systems process most of each update 
transaction locally at the receiving replica and only certify the 
core writesets at the certifier. Certifying the writesets is an order 
of magnitude less work than executing the transaction. Thus, 
the Tashkent designs effectively distribute much of the update 
transaction workload. 
11 Conclusions 
This paper identifies a limitation to scalability in replicated 
database designs concerning durability and commit ordering. 
We analyze the dependency between guaranteeing durability 
and maintaining a global commit order. This dependency 
appears in replicated database systems in which replicas agree 
both on which update transactions commit and on the order of 
their commits. By uniting durability with ordering, the two 
actions are done in one phase, which greatly improves 
scalability. 
We present Tashkent-MW and Tashkent-API as two example 
solutions that unite durability and ordering. In Tashkent-MW, 
durability is united with commit ordering in the replication 
middleware. Tashkent-MW is a pure middleware solution for 
high-performance replicated databases.  
Tashkent-API unites durability and commit ordering inside the 
database. The replication middleware passes the commit order 
information to the database. In this solution, additional care 
must be taken to ensure the middleware proxy does not generate 
artificial conflicts between remote writesets that are submitted 
concurrently. This constraint prevents some opportunities to 
combine durability and ordering. 
We also present Base, a replicated database system where 
durability and commit ordering are separate. We experimentally 
compare Tashkent-MW and Tashkent-API to Base to assess the 
benefits of uniting durability and commit ordering. 
We implement the Base, Tashkent-MW and Tashkent-API 
systems on top of PostgreSQL and analyze their performance 
using our AllUpdates benchmark as well as the standard 
benchmarks TPC-B and TPC-W. Under high update transaction 
loads the advantages of uniting durability and ordering become 
significant. We show that both versions of Tashkent greatly 
improve scalability under high update loads and outperform 
Base by factors of 5 and 3 times, respectively, in throughput 
while also providing lower response times. 
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